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ABSTRACT 
Thinking about others' conscious experiences (emotional feelings, perceptual experience, 
moods, etc.) seems commonplace in human social life, yet this aspect of social cognition has 
been largely ignored by social psychologists and philosophers. In this paper, I develop the 
beginnings of an account of how we understand other conscious minds. My view builds off of 
the dominant hybrid theory, which is the view that people use two distinct processes to think 
about others' mental states: theorizing and mental simulation. My main argument is that we can 
attribute conscious experiences to others using either simulation or theorizing, but simulations 
are better mental representations of others' conscious experiences than instances of theorizing. 
Simulations thereby provide us with a deeper understanding of others' experiences than 
theorizing does.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
People think about other people's conscious experiences. We often, for instance, think 
about what others are feeling or what it is like to see the world from their point of view. The way 
we come to understand others' conscious experiences, however, is a topic that has historically 
received little attention by social psychologists and philosophers. Traditionally, the focus has 
been on explaining the way people understand the contents and causal-functional properties of 
other people's attitudes (e.g. beliefs, intentions, and desires) for the purpose of predicting and 
explaining others' behavior — a practice often called 'folk psychology' or 'mindreading' (e.g. 
Daniel Dennett,1987; Alison Gopnik & Andrew Meltzoff,1997; Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich, 
2003). But, conscious experiences have properties that are distinct from causal properties. They 
also have phenomenal character or what-it-is-likeness. Moreover, many conscious experiences 
have contents that seem distinct from the contents of attitudes. Contents of experience seem, for 
example, much more rich and finely grained than the contents of attitudes like belief (Raffman, 
1995; Block, 2011). Thus, the question of how we come to understand the experiential properties 
of other minds is a question that has been left largely unanswered. 
In this paper, I develop the beginnings of an account of how we understand other people's 
conscious experiences. My view builds off of the currently dominant hybrid theory, which is the 
view that people use two distinct processes to mindread: theorizing and mental simulation.1 
Theorizing involves the use of a body of information about mental states (a theory of mind) 
stored in our brains to make inferences about other people's mental states and behaviors. 
Simulation processes involve replicating other people's mental processes in our own minds 
through the reuse of our own cognitive mechanisms. My main argument is that people attribute 
                                                 
1  Shannon Spaulding's (2018) recent assessment is that hybrid theories are the "main contemporary general 
theories" of mindreading (64). 
2 
conscious experiences to others using both simulations and theorizing, but simulations are better 
mental representations of others' conscious experiences than instances of theorizing. Simulations, 
for this reason, provide us with a deeper understanding of others' conscious experiences than 
theorizing does. 
That we gain a deeper understanding of others' conscious experiences through simulation 
is an idea that has already received some attention. Philip Robbins & Anthony Jack (2006), for 
example, discuss the importance of empathy (a process often equated or tied to simulation 
processes) for attributing conscious experiences to others. Ravenscroft (1998) and Steven Biggs 
(2007, 2009) have also argued for the importance of simulations for understanding others' 
experiences.2 All of these views, however, come up short in explaining why simulations are so 
important for understanding others' experiences. One problem is that all of these views focus 
solely on discussing the way we understand the phenomenal character, or what-it-is-likeness, of 
others' conscious states, while ignoring the way we understand other properties often associated 
with conscious experience, such as richness and fineness of grain. Furthermore, what these views 
have to say about the way we understand the phenomenal character of others' experiences, in my 
opinion, is not quite right, and I present my alternative account below. Thus, although the 
importance of simulation for understanding others' experiences has already been noted, we are 
still in need of an adequate explanation of why they are so important and superior to theorizing. I 
aim to provide such an explanation in this paper and, in so doing, provide the beginnings of an 
account of the way we understand other conscious minds. 
 I argue there are four properties of conscious experience that simulations can represent 
which instances of theorizing cannot. Consider a visual experience of seeing the Mona Lisa. 
                                                 
2  See also Alvin Goldman (1993, 2002)  and Adam Arico et. al (2011) for further discussions of folk psychology 
and consciousness. 
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First, this experience has phenomenal character. There is something it is like to see the painting. 
Second, there is a perspectival aspect to the experience, which refers, roughly, to the aspects of 
the experience of the painting that change with viewing position. Third, the contents of the 
experience are finely-grained or highly specific. One does not just experience a face-like shape, 
one experiences a face with a very particular shape. Fourth, the experience is rich in that it 
represents a great many visual details (colors, shapes, etc.), more than can be contained in a 
single thought. My claim is that when one theorizes about others' experiences, their theory-based 
mental representations will not represent these experiential properties. In order to mentally 
represent them, and in turn understand another's experience, one must mentally simulate the 
experience. In this case, a simulation would be a mental image of the Mona Lisa seen from 
another's point of view.3 
This view can be separated into two theses: 
Deficiency of Theorizing Thesis: People cannot represent the phenomenal  character, the 
 perspectival aspect, the richness, or the fineness of grain of others'  conscious experiences 
 through theorizing alone. 
 
Advantage of Simulation Thesis: People are able to represent the phenomenal character, 
 the perspectival aspect, the richness, and fineness of grain of others' experiences through 
 simulation. 
 
Two clarifications: First, these theses are claims about the psychological limitations of 
people. They are not intended to identify any metaphysical limitations on the representability of 
conscious experience. I accept that there could, in principle, exist a being with an advanced 
theory of mind that can adequately represent all the experiential properties of others' conscious 
states through theorizing. I only mean to argue that humans are not such beings due to 
                                                 
3  I will be using the term 'understand' to refer to our ability to mentally represent something. This is distinct from 
about our ability know things. I do not make any claims about our ability to know others' experiences, just claims 
about our abilities to form mental representations of them. 
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psychological limitations. Second, as I explain in detail below, I do not mean to claim 
simulations are perfect representations of others' experiences, only that they can represent 
experiential properties and can do so well. 
Why can humans represent the experiential properties of others' mental states through 
simulation but not through theorizing? My argument rests on the different way each mindreading 
process represents mental properties. The core argument runs as follows: 
1) In order for our ToM (and ToM-based thought) to represent some mental property,     
     it must describe that mental property using an underlying representational medium. 
 
2) In order for simulations to represent a mental property, they must replicate it. 
 
3) Experiential properties are too difficult to describe in the representational medium  
     underlying our theory of mind but not too difficult to replicate through simulation. 
 
4) Thus, we can represent experiential properties through simulation but not through    
     theorizing. 
 
The main crux of this argument is premise three. Premises one and two are not meant to be 
controversial, but they do need some explanation, which is provided in sections two and three 
along with a detailed description of each mindreading process and their representational 
properties. In sections four and five, I defend premise three. In section six, I discuss some 
limitations simulations have, and I conclude by discussing what my account explains and what 
questions it leaves open. 
2 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MINDREADING 
I will assume the currently dominant hybrid view of mindreading — the view that we use 
both theorizing and simulations to attribute mental states to others — so we will need to 
understand the basics behind each mindreading process. 
 
5 
2.1 Basics of theorizing 
Theorizing is a process that involves the access and utilization of a mentally represented 
theory of mind (ToM). Our ToM is a rich body of information about mental states, behaviors, 
and their relations that is thought to be structured somewhat like a scientific theory. 4 The process 
of theorizing works in, roughly, the following way: first, we gather information about others (e.g. 
we may gather behavioral information through observation). Next, we use this gathered 
information and information stored in our ToM to make mental state attributions (e.g. she 
believes it is noon). Finally, we (may) predict others' behavior based on these mental state 
attributions and other information in our ToM (e.g. she will take her lunch break soon).  
Many agree our ToM has a theory-like structure, but there is some disagreement about 
what that theory-like structure is. Early theories held that our ToM consisted of something like a 
set sentences expressing psychological laws or generalizations about mental states and behaviors 
(see Ravenscroft, 2016; Alison Gopnik & Andrew Meltzoff, 1997). A generalization, for 
example, might be that if someone wants X and believes that action A will help them acquire X, 
they will perform A. Thus, theorizing involves a deductive reasoning process in which one uses a 
generalization and knowledge about a particular person (or persons) to deduce what they will do 
or what mental states they have. If one observes another perform action A, and their ToM 
contains the generalization that only mental state M causes action A, for example, one can 
deduce that the other has M. 
Nowadays, the view that our ToM consists of laws or generalizations is resisted 
somewhat. Instead, an alternative view has emerged that is gaining traction. The view, first 
forwarded by Heidi Maibom (2003) and Peter Godfrey-Smith (2005) and recently endorsed by 
others like Shannon Spaulding (2018), is the view that our ToM consists of a collection of 
                                                 
4  I use the term "information" here and in what follows to mean mental content. 
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psychological models rather than law-like generalizations. Theorizing, under this view, is 
understood as a process of model building rather than deductive reasoning using generalizations. 
Models are hypothetical structures used to describe some target system(s). In the case of folk 
psychology, the idea is that when we theorize about others' mental states and predict their 
behaviors, we construct models of others' mental states (beliefs, percepts, desires, etc.), their 
interactions, and their influences on behavior (Godfrey-Smith, 2005, 5). We may use more 
abstract and general models, which we can store and apply to various people at different times, 
or we may develop much more specific models on the spot, which we apply to a particular 
individual at a specific time (Godfrey-Smith, 2005, 5-8).  
2.2 Basics of simulation 
Simulations are mental processes which have the function of replicating other people's 
mental states (Goldman, 2006, 36-38). Theories of mental simulations attempt to explain the 
common process of putting ourselves in others' shoes. The basic idea is that our minds work like 
other people's do, so we can explain and predict what others will do or think by putting our own 
minds into the same (or similar) state as another's and observing the resulting mental processes. 
If I, for instance, want to predict what decision my friend will make, instead of theorizing about 
what she might decide, I can pretend I have the same relevant beliefs and desires as she does. I 
can then run these pretend beliefs and desires through my own decision-making mechanism 
(which is assumed to work like hers) and observe what (pretend) decision is outputted. After 
replicating my friend's decision, I then attribute or project it to her, which means I form a belief 
that my friend made the decision I simulated. Importantly, simulations are run offline — they are 
inhibited from affecting the simulator's behaviors and other mental states (Goldman, 2006, 26-
41). Simulating my friend's decision will not cause me to act on the simulated decision.  
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Some theorizing may be involved in simulation processes. For example, when we 
observe another's behavior or acquire information about another's decision, we may need to use 
our ToM to reason backward from this information to the possible mental states that caused the 
behavior or decision. These inferred mental states can then be simulated and their outputs 
assessed. If they caused the right (inhibited) motor signal or (pretend) decision then we may 
conclude that the target has the simulated mental states. If not, we may test other possible causes 
(Goldman, 2006, 44-45). The difference between this process and pure theorizing is that the 
representation of the target's mental state is a simulation, not a ToM-based thought (more on this 
in the next section). 
There is disagreement about the range of mental states we can simulate. Some hybrid 
theorists hold that there are only a few mental processes we simulate when mindreading (e.g. 
Stich & Nichols, 2003), while others believe simulations are much more widespread (e.g. Alvin 
Goldman, 2006). My theses depend on the claim that we can and do simulate other peoples 
perceptual states, emotions, and sensations, so I assume we at least simulate these states. I cannot 
fully defend this assumption here, but I present some key evidence in support of it. 
Alvin Goldman (2006) is the main developer and proponent of the simulation theory of 
mindreading. Goldman distinguishes between two sorts of simulation processes: low-level and 
high-level simulations (113-191). Low-level simulations are involuntary, fast, and automatic. 
These sorts of simulations are implemented in mirror neurons, which are groups of neurons that 
activate both when one is in a particular mental state (e.g. disgust) and when one observes 
another in the same mental state (e.g. observes another make a disgusted face) (Goldman, 2009b, 
311-314). Mirror neurons underlie several sorts of states including motor intentions, tactile 
sensations, and several emotions. Some evidence for the existence of mirror neurons is fMRI 
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data which shows the same areas of the brain activating both when one is in a certain mental 
state and when one observes another behaviorally express that same mental state. Evidence that 
mirror neurons are used in mindreading, specifically, comes, in part, from cases of mirror neuron 
damage. In these cases, patients have deficits both in feeling a particular emotion or sensation 
and deficits in the ability to recognize that emotion or sensation in other people (see Goldman, 
2009b, 317-320).5  
High-level simulations, unlike low-level simulations are controlled, deliberate, 
imaginative processes. We can use high-level simulations to replicate other people's visual states 
(e.g. seeing a red apple), auditory perceptions (e.g. hearing Stairway to Heaven), motor plans 
(e.g. wiggling your fingers), among other states. Evidence for high-level simulations comes, in 
part, from evidence that general, controlled, imaginative processes use many of the same brain 
areas as the mental states they simulate. There is good evidence, for instance, that we use areas 
of our visual cortex for both visual perception and visual imagination, and we use the same 
motor areas of the brain to produce motor imagery (e.g. imagining wiggling one's own fingers) 
and actual motor movements, suggesting that if we simulate others' mental states using these 
imaginative processes, we are indeed replicating others' mental states. (Kosslyn, Ganis, and 
Thompson, 2001).  
There is also empirical evidence that strongly supports the claim that these general 
imaginative processes are used by people to mindread. For example, there is evidence that people 
have visual perceptual biases — information from one visual field is processed better than 
information from the other visual field. Cognitive neuroscientists Brandon Bio, Taylor Webb, 
and Michael Graziano (2017) created a mindreading task in which one must assess what a person 
                                                 
5  Some, such as Shannon Spaulding (2012), argue that mirror neurons are not used in mindreading. These criticisms 
tend to focus on mirror neurons underlying motor intentions. Goldman (2009a) points out, however, that the best 
evidence mirror neurons are used in mindreading exists for emotions and tactile sensations, not motor intentions.  
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displayed in a graphic is able to see. The person in the graphic is viewed from above and is 
facing to the subject's right. In some trials the displayed person's view is obstructed by a barrier. 
When asked if the person in the display can see an object, it was found that people's reaction 
times differed depending on which of the displayed agent's fields of views (right or left) the 
object was present in. The only way to explain this is that people must be imagining (i.e. 
simulating) what the displayed agent can see, which then results in the attributer's own visual 
biases affecting the time it takes them to attribute a mental state to the displayed agent. If the 
subjects were only theorizing, we would not expect their perceptual biases to affect their reaction 
times because theorizing would not utilize our perceptual systems.  
Finally, it should be noted that sometimes we do not need to use mirror neurons or 
imaginative processes to replicate others' mental states. Sometimes others just happen to be in 
the same state that we are in. If one is at a concert, for example, there is no need to imagine or 
mirror others' states. One can simply form the belief that others around them a hearing what they 
are. One is still simulating, in these cases, because they are treating their own current mental 
state as a replication of another's (Goldman, 2006, 41). 
2.3 Representational distinctions 
Crucial for our discussion is the different ways theorizing and simulation processes 
represent others' mental states. The main difference is that our ToM represents others' mental 
states using a representational medium, while simulations do not (see, e.g., Godfrey-Smith, 
2005, p.7). A representational medium can be understood as some physical or functional 
"vehicle" for content. Words written in ink, for example, can be seen as physical vehicles 
carrying linguistic contents. Similarly, physical-functional structures in the mind can act as 
vehicles for mental content. I will call mental representational mediums mental codes. Our ToM 
10 
(whether it be sentences expressing psychological laws or models of mental states and behavior) 
is represented by this mental code. Our ToM can thus be seen as a mentally represented theory-
like description of mental states and behaviors. Concepts used in ToM-based mindreading (pain, 
belief, desire, seeing, etc.) are constituents of our ToM, so when we theorize and utilize these 
concepts we are describing others' mental states using a representational medium (Weiskopf, 
2009).6 A ToM-based concept of belief, for example, is a description of various properties of 
belief "written" in a mental code. 
As mentioned earlier, some theorizing may be used to construct or generate simulations, 
but simulations themselves are what act as representations of others' mental states in simulation 
processes. Simulations do not represent others' mental states through a representational medium. 
They are not descriptions "written" in a mental code. Rather, simulations represent by replicating 
others' mental properties. Simulations are, in this way, physical-functional objects or processes. 
A simulation of  belief is an actual (pretend) belief which (is supposed to have) the same 
properties as the target's belief, and by replicating its properties the simulation represents them.  
Consider a common analogy that helps illustrate this distinction. Aeronautical engineers 
can test a new wing design in several ways. One way is to write down physics equations on 
paper that describe the wing and calculate how the wing will perform in various wind conditions. 
This is analogous to theorizing, as it uses a representational medium (mathematical symbols 
written on paper) to represent and reason about the physical properties of the wing. Another way 
to test a new wing design is to actually build the wing and put the wing in a wind tunnel. This is 
analogous to simulation processes as there is no representational medium, only a physical object 
meant to replicate the physical properties of the new wing. 
                                                 
6  Another view is that mental state concepts are not constituents of theories but rather are mini-theories themselves. 
I will assume the concepts as constituents view, as I think it is more widely assumed, but my arguments will apply to 
the concepts as mini-theories view also. See Weiskopf (2009) for further discussion. 
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3 A NOTE ABOUT MENTAL REPRESENTATION 
We have just discussed some differences in the ways simulation processes and theorizing 
represent others' mental states. More needs to be said, however, about what I mean by 'represent' 
in general, as there are many theories of mental content and not much agreement about which is 
best. 
Here, again, are premise one and two of my main argument:  
1) In order for our ToM (or ToM-based thought) to represent some mental property, our 
 ToM (or thought) must describe that property using a representational medium.  
 
2) In order for a simulation to represent some mental property , the simulation must 
 replicate it. 
                                                               
For a ToM-based attribution to represent the causal properties of another's belief, for instance, it 
must describe those causal properties using a representational medium, a mental code. In order 
for a simulation to represent the causal properties of another's belief it must replicate them. 
These assumptions may seem obvious given what was said in the last section, but they 
are not uncontroversial within philosophical discussions of mental content. Some theories of 
mental content hold that a person can mentally represent some property or object despite the fact 
that she lacks any mental description (or mental replication) of the property or object. For 
example, someone's concept of water will under some views have the content H20 even if the 
person has no mental description of the molecule H20, its relation to water (i.e. that the two are, 
more or less, the same), or that it even exists. All that is required is that when one uses their 
concept of water they are referring to H20 (see Lau & Deutsch, 2016). For example, people who 
lived several hundred years ago arguably had concepts of water that referred to H20 without 
have any mental descriptions of the referent's molecular structure or its relation to water. 
12 
The reason I place a higher standard on what counts as mental representation is it seems 
necessary to explain the way we come to understand the properties of the world, including 
experiential properties of other people's mental states. Explaining the way we acquire such an 
understanding is, after all, the aim of this paper. If one's concept of water, for instance, contained 
a mental description of H20, oen would understand the molecular structure of H20. Also, 
consider the concept what it is like for that bat to echolocate. This concept (when employed in 
thought) does refer to the phenomenal character of a bat's echolocative experience, and some 
views of mental content would, on these grounds, accept that the concept represents it. But, this 
concept does not yield an understanding of what it is like to be a bat echolocating. One can 
utilize this concept in thought without understanding bat phenomenology. But, if one's concept 
described its referent (phenomenal character of bat echolocation) then one would understand 
what it is like to be a bat. Or if we, though simulation, replicated bat phenomenology in our own 
minds, we would understand what it is like to be a bat. One way to explain why the requirement 
for description and replication better captures what it means to understand something is that they 
require contents play the right sort of cognitive roles for understanding. Roughly put, we 
understand things that are described or replicated in our own minds because mental descriptions 
and replicated mental properties play a significant cognitive role.  In sum, under my view in 
order to mentally represent some property (in a way that yields understanding), a mental state 
must adequately describe or replicate that property. In the next section, I explain why or ToM 
and ToM-based thought cannot adequately describe experiential properties. 
 
13 
4 SOME PROPERTIES OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
We now have a basic understanding of simulation and theorizing and their 
representational properties. Next, in order to understand why simulations are better than 
theorizing at representing others' conscious experiences, we will need to discuss phenomenal 
consciousness. There are four properties of phenomenal experiences that will be important for 
our discussion: 
Phenomenal Character: A mental state is considered a phenomenal state or experience if 
there is something it is like to be in that state. Phenomenal states, in other words, have a certain 
feel to them. My visual perception of a red tomato, for example, is a phenomenal state because 
there is something it is like for me to see the tomato. What it is like to be in a state or the way a 
state feels is often referred to as the state's phenomenal character. Other phenomenal states 
include emotional feelings, pains, tickles, itches, auditory percepts, smells, and tastes. 7  
There is some debate about whether cognitive states, which includes states like belief and 
intentions, have phenomenal character. While many believe there may be some phenomenal 
character associated with these states, many doubt cognitive attitudes have any distinctive 
phenomenal character (e.g. Nichols & Stich, 2003; Goldman, 2006). For this reason, I will stick 
to using sensory and perceptual experiences as my primary examples of phenomenal states in 
what follows. 
Perspectival Aspect: Second, visual and auditory experiences have perspectival aspects. 
One's visual and auditory experience of objects and sounds change depending on one's position 
and viewing angle. For example, when viewed from above, a coin laying on the ground will look 
circular. When viewed from an angle, although there is a sense in which the coin will still appear 
                                                 
7  I will use the words "experience", "phenomenal state", and "conscious state" interchangeably. All will refer to 
states that have phenomenal character or what-it-is-likeness. 
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circular, there is also a sense in which its shape now looks elliptical. Consider also the way a 
building looks from close up and far away. There is a sense in which the building in each case 
appears to be the same size, but also a sense in which their appearance differs depending the 
distance it is from the viewer (from far away there is a sense in which the building looks smaller 
than it does from close up). The aspect of one's experience that changes with view-point and 
position is the perspectival aspect of experience (Greene and Schellenberg, 2018).  
There is some disagreement as to what the perspectival aspects of our experiences consist 
in. Some believe they consist in certain contents of experience (e.g. Greene and Schellenberg, 
2017), while others believe they are non-representational properties (e.g. Peacocke, 1983). I 
remain neutral on these debates accepting only that there is some aspect of one's (visual and 
auditory) experience of an object that changes with one's perspective. 
Fineness of Grain: Third, phenomenal experiences have contents that are much more 
finely grained than our general (or type) concepts (Tye, 2006, p.518). There is good empirical 
evidence, for example, that people are able to discriminate between (and presumably experience) 
thousands of different shades of color, and over a thousand different pitches of sound (Raffman, 
1995). However, people are able to recognize (or type-identify) much fewer. We can see 
thousands of colors and hear thousands of pitches, but we certainly do not have as many general 
color concepts (red, green, blue, etc.) or general pitch concepts (C-sharp, F, etc.) that can be used 
to identify and distinguish each color and pitch we can experience. Besides visual and auditory 
experience, it is also plausible that other experiences, like pain or emotion, are finely grained. 
For example, it seems plausible that we can experience more intensities of pain or emotional 
feeling than we have corresponding general concepts for (e.g. intense, a little intense, etc.).  
15 
Some disagree about how finely grained our experiences really are (e.g. Papineau, 
forthcoming). However, it is much less controversial (given both intuition and empirical 
considerations) that our experiences are more finely grained than our general concepts. There are 
some complications to the fineness of grain hypothesis concerning the use of demonstratives 
(this shade of red), but, as I explain in the next section, these considerations do not threaten or 
matter much for what I am arguing here. 
Richness: Fourth, many perceptual experiences have rich contents in that they represent 
more details than can be extracted for cognitive use (Tye, 2006; Block, 2011). Another way of 
describing the richness hypothesis is that there are more details represented by experience than 
can be contained in a single thought (Speaks, 2005).8 This hypothesis has intuitive force. 
Consider, for example, that your current visual experience is representing dozens of different 
shapes on your computer screen (every letter within your field of view) and their spatial 
locations. Consider, also the great many details represented in auditory experiences of music or 
tactile experiences of textured surfaces. There seem to be just too many details represented in 
these experiences to be contained in a single thought.  
Empirical evidence also supports the richness hypothesis. Evidence often comes in 
"Sperling-style" experiments, which are experiments in which a stimuli is flashed briefly, then 
after a short period of time subjects are asked to report a portion of what they saw. In Sperlings' 
(1960) original experiment, an array with three rows of four letters is flashed on a screen. Shortly 
afterward, the subject is signaled to read back one of the rows. Most subjects are able to do so. 
But, what they are not able to do is read back all of the letters from all rows. Subjects, however, 
                                                 
8 To see how richness is distinct from fineness of grain, consider a "ganzfeld" or a visual experience of uniform field 
of one color. Such a visual experience would not be rich (it would only have one color property), but it would be 
finely grained as one would be experiencing a particular shade of color. 
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report experiencing an image of all the letters from all the rows after the array is flashed. Other 
similar experiments yield similar results (see Block, 2011). The conclusion many draw from 
such evidence is that people are unable to extract all the contents of experience into working 
memory for cognitive use. Only some contents can be extracted, suggesting that the 
informational capacity of working memory (and any cognitive process that utilizes it) is much 
smaller than that of perceptual experience. Thus, experience seems richer than cognition. 
The richness hypothesis is much more controversial than the fineness of grain hypothesis 
and debates are ongoing (e.g. Dennett, 2001; Cohen & Dennett, 2011). I cannot do justice to the 
debate here. The richness hypothesis, however, is a plausible empirical hypothesis with growing 
empirical support (e.g. Block, 2011, 2014; D'Aloisio-Montilla, 2017). As such, I will treat it as 
the currently most plausible hypothesis in what follows, admitting that further empirical research 
might show it to be false. 
Finally, it should be noted that not all conscious experiences have every one of these 
experiential properties. All experiences, by definition, will have phenomenal character. But, only 
visual and auditory experiences clearly have perspectival aspects. Some experiences, too, are not 
especially rich, like an auditory experience of a single tone or a simple pain sensation in one's 
back. But, many experiences do seem quite rich, such as visual and auditory experience, tactile 
sensations of texture, and multimodal experiences which combine information from multiple 
senses (e.g. the experience of driving a loud car down a bumpy street). My theses, then, can be 
seen as being more true the more experiential properties the target's mental states have and less 
true the fewer experiential properties their mental states have. 
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5 WHAT THEORIZING CANNOT DO 
We can now turn to the argument for the Deficiency of Theorizing Thesis (DTT) and 
premise three of my main argument, which is that experiential properties are too difficult to 
describe through theorizing. The argument here is that the representational medium, or mental 
code, used to represent our ToM cannot describe experiential properties and thus will not play 
the right cognitive role to qualify as representing such properties. As mentioned above, I am not 
making the metaphysical claim that no representational medium can ever represent experiential 
properties. I only mean to make a claim about the psychological limitations of humans. 
5.1 Theorizing about Phenomenal Character 
Let's first consider phenomenal character and what we are able to theorize about it. It 
seems perfectly possible to refer to phenomenal states through theorizing. The ToM-based 
attributions  she is in pain or she is feeling joy are thoughts that plausibly refer to phenomenal 
states. There is an interesting empirical question about which folk ToM concepts refer to 
phenomenal states and which do not that is still, in my opinion, open. Some studies have found 
that people are willing to attribute mental states like belief but not pain states to robots (e.g. 
Huebner, 2010). Studies like this provide some preliminary evidence that our ToM concepts of 
sensations like pain refer to phenomenal states, while ToM concepts of attitudes like belief refer 
to functional states. These experiments, however, do not test whether participants are theorizing 
or using simulations in the studies, so the results are somewhat ambiguous. In any case, I take it 
to be empirically plausible that at least some of our ToM concepts refer to phenomenal states and 
thus we can and sometimes do attribute phenomenal states when theorizing.  
Additionally, it seems perfectly possible to theorize about phenomenal character, in 
particular. We can, for instance, theorize (without simulation) pain has a phenomenal character 
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or there is something it is like to be a bat. Such thoughts are uncommon in lay people, but 
common in philosophers. These thoughts would refer, specifically, to the phenomenal character 
of certain conscious states. 
Even though it seems plausible that some of our ToM-based concepts refer to 
phenomenal states and that people can form ToM-based thoughts that refer to phenomenal 
character, such thoughts and concepts do not describe the phenomenal character of the states 
they refer to. The concept what it is like to be a bat might refer to the phenomenal character of 
bat echolocation, but it does not describe the character of that state in a way that would allow one 
to understand what it is like to be a bat. Similarly, my claim is that a ToM-based concept pain 
might refer to a phenomenal state, but will not describe what the phenomenal character of pain 
is. Such concepts might be said to describe the general fact that certain states have a phenomenal 
character, but these concepts will not describe what the phenomenal character of that state is. 
Therefore, ToM based thoughts and concepts will not play the sort of cognitive role needed to 
represent what it is like to have various phenomenal states. 
Why can such concepts not describe phenomenal character? The reason is simply that 
phenomenal character is very difficult to describe — too difficult for our ToM to describe in 
practice. The difficulty of describing phenomenal character has been discussed by many 
philosophers. Thomas Nagel (1974) argues that physical-functional descriptions of bat brains do 
not lead us to understand the phenomenal character of echolocation. Frank Jackson (1982) argues 
that a person who has never seen color cannot come to know what it is like to see color by 
studying a complete physical-functional description of the human visual system. Many have also 
pointed out that it seems impossible to verbally describe the phenomenal character of one's own 
experience to another (e.g. Chalmers, 1996, 222-225). A sighted person, for example, cannot 
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explain to a congenitally blind person what it is like to see color by verbally describing their 
current color experience.9 The basic idea behind these claims is that if one learns these 
descriptions, and thereby mentally represents their contents, they do not come to mentally 
represent facts about what it is like to have the described experience. They do not learn what the 
phenomenal character of those experiences are. So, it seems, such facts were not contained in or 
represented by the descriptions in the first place.  
Some of these arguments (e.g. Jackson, 1982) are used to make controversial 
metaphysical claims about consciousness: roughly, because a complete physical-functional 
description of the brain cannot lead one to understand the what-it-is-likeness of experience, 
consciousness is non-physical. But, my view does not rest on these controversial claims. The 
DTT does not rest on the claim that the phenomenal character of an experience is indescribable 
in principle. It only rests on the claim that phenomenal character cannot be described by our 
ToM or ToM-based thought in practice. The DTT is completely compatible with physicalism. 
One can accept that the phenomenal character of an experience is completely describable in 
principle but indescribable in practice.  
Why is phenomenal character indescribable, in practice? The main reason is that there is 
still very little consensus among philosophers and scientists about what consciousness even is, let 
alone what, if any, physical-functional states of the brain consciousness reduces to. If scientists 
and philosophers who study consciousness lack descriptions and theories of consciousness that 
                                                 
9  Some aspects of experience are describable. An experience's form or structure (e.g. spatial-temporal form) and 
some of the contents of experience, for example, seem describable (see Chalmers, 1996, 222-225). I will assume, 
however, that phenomenal character goes beyond the mere structure and content of experience. 
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capture the phenomenal characters of conscious states, then we cannot expect that anyone's ToM 
will have such descriptions. 10  
Furthermore, even if a satisfactory theory of consciousness existed, it would likely not be 
the sort of theory that would be psychologically integrated with a folk ToM and used in typical 
social situations. Such a theory, after all, would likely be incredibly complex, involving either 
complicated mathematical or computational details (not unlike, for example, those involved in 
information integration theory) or complex neuronal or functional details (Tononi, 2004). These 
are just not the sorts of details we would expect a lay person to have stored in their intuitive ToM 
or utilized in social situations to describe the character of others' particular conscious states. The 
situation would be similar to a physicist using her scientific knowledge of a complex theory of 
space and gravity to calculate, very quickly, the projectile motion of a ball thrown to her. It just 
does not seem possible for her to do. Her scientific knowledge, in other words, would not get 
integrated with her folk physics knowledge in such a way that it would be utilized in  everyday 
situations where one needs to make quick judgments about some physical system's behavior.11 
This argument can be formed into a less controversial analog of Jackson's (1982) Mary 
the neuroscientist argument. Jackson argues that even if Mary, a neuroscientist who has been 
trapped in a colorless room her whole life, learned all the physical-functional facts about color 
vision, she would not come to know what it is like to see color. My argument, on the other hand, 
is only that if Mary acquired all the information contained in a typical folk ToM (or had a ToM 
                                                 
10  Biggs (2009) also argues that phenomenal experience is ineffable in practice, and he, from this, argues that the 
only way to mentally represent others experience is through simulation (and a phenomenal concept) (653-656). The 
problem is he follows Dennett (2002) in believing phenomenal experience is ineffable in practice because 
experiences are too rich to describe. But, consider, for example, a simple experience of a red screen. Even though 
this experience is not rich, one is still unable to describe this experience to a congenitally blind person, at least, in 
practice. Richness, thus, is not what lies at the root of the ineffability of experience, phenomenal character does.  
11  There exists good empirical evidence that people with scientific knowledge of physics do not use their scientific 
knowledge to make judgments about the behavior of physical systems when put under time constraints. Rather, they 
tend to fall back on their folk physics system. 
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"downloaded" to her brain), she would not come to know what it is like to see color because 
facts about what it is like to see color will not be represented in a typical folk ToM. 
 Furthermore, even if her knowledge of the physical-functional facts about the human 
visual system did fully describe color experience, this knowledge would not get integrated with 
her ToM in a way that would allow her to utilize it in practice in everyday social situations (say, 
with colorless people). She would not be able to mentally represent what the phenomenal 
character of others' color experiences were as she were interacting with them, not unlike the way 
physicists cannot use their knowledge of scientific physics to quickly calculate the projectile 
motion of an object thrown to them. 12  
In sum, when people theorize about others' mental states, they sometimes may be 
referring to phenomenal states, but their ToM-based thoughts and concepts will not be describing 
the phenomenal character of those states and thus will not be representing what the phenomenal 
character of those states are. The character of experience is just too difficult to describe, and even 
if such descriptions were available, they would not be of the sort that would get integrated with 
our ToM and utilized in practice.  
5.2 Theorizing and the Perspectival Aspect of Experience 
Next, why can we not represent the perspectival aspect of others' experience through 
theorizing? When we are theorizing about what another is seeing, why can we not represent the 
perspective-dependent 'look' the object has? The answer here is that forming such a description 
in the mental code underlying our ToM seems too computationally difficult to do in practice, and 
there is no empirical evidence to say otherwise. 
                                                 
12  Thanks to Neil Van Leeuwen pointing out the Mary analogy. 
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The perspectival aspect of experience refers to the aspect of one's experience that changes 
as one's position and viewing angle change (e.g. the aspect of one's visual experience of a coin's 
shape that changes as their viewing angle changes). To compute the way something looks from a 
particular position or viewing angle one must begin with information about the object being 
viewed and the angle from which it is viewed. We may be able to acquire such information 
through observation. For instance, I might observe that another is looking at a chair from the 
front and from a certain angle and distance. The next step is calculate the way the chair looks 
from that angle and distance away.  
One way to calculate the perspectival aspect is to begin with a 3D representation of the 
chair and information about the viewing location and angle, then compute the pattern of light that 
reflects off the chair and falls on a flat 2D surface located some distance between the observation 
position and the chair (Noë, 2005). To do so, one must perform complex geometrical 
calculations to produce some sort of description (not an image) of the way the 3D object will 
reflect light onto a 2D surface located at a certain distance and angle away. These calculations, 
however, must be done without the use of imagery. There is little doubt, as I argue in the next 
section, that we are able to imagine, and thus simulate, the way things look from various angles 
(you can likely imagine, for example, the way your car looks from various angles). Remember, 
though, that using imagination to replicate others' mental states is just a form of (high-level) 
simulation. Thus, for theorizing to describe a perspectival aspect, it must generate, instead, some 
non-imagistic description of the pattern of light falling on the 2D surface. This task may be 
possible in principle. Some people may be able to do this if they sat down, with pen and paper, 
and performed these complex geometrical calculations. But it seems too complex a task for the 
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average person to do in practice in a typical social situation through the sort of reasoning 
involved in theorizing.13 
Finally, there is no empirical evidence, at least that I can find, that supports the view that 
we compute perspectival aspects of others' perceptual experiences through theorizing. Any task 
that has been tested in which subjects make judgments about the perspectival aspects of others' 
(visual or auditory) perceptions, moreover, can likely be explained as instances in which the 
subject is utilizing simulations rather than theorizing. Thus, unless new empirical evidence 
emerges on this issue, the best explanation is that people just cannot form a mental description of 
the perspectival aspect of others' experiences through theorizing. 
5.3 Theorizing and Fineness of Grain 
The fineness of grain hypothesis says that our general (or type) concepts are more coarse 
grained than the corresponding contents of experience. The main limitation on theorizing is that 
we seem only able to use general concepts when theorizing. Theorizing is typically understood 
as a cognitive process and thus will be utilizing concepts available to cognitive processes (object 
recognition, reasoning, decision making) to attribute content. The evidence cited earlier, 
however, suggests that the concepts available for cognitive processes are type concepts which are 
much more coarse-grained than experience. It may be possible to theorize that she is seeing red 
or that she is feeling very joyful, but it does not seem possible to theorize she is seeing red23 or 
that she is feeling joy6  (where red23 describes a particular shade of red and joy6 describes a joyful 
feeling of a particular fine-grained intensity).  
One complication here is that many believe we can use demonstratives to think about 
particular fine-grained contents of experience (e.g. Tye, 2006). For example, one can think about 
                                                 
13  There may be other ways to compute the perspectival aspect of experience, but any other method would likely 
have to be similar to the one described here and thus would face similar complexity. 
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this particular shade of red that they are experiencing or this particular intensity of joy. Such 
demonstratives seem to pick out particular fine-grained contents. But, this point is no challenge 
to my argument because if one uses a demonstrative, they are engaging in a simulation process 
and not theorizing. More specifically, their representation of the target's fine-grained content is a 
simulation of it (a replication) rather than a ToM-based concept of it. If one thinks that another 
person is experiencing, say, the same shade of red that they themselves are experiencing (this 
shade), then the attributer is treating a content of their own current experience (this shade of red I 
see) as replicating a content of another's mental state (the shade of red they see), which is just a 
form of simulation. Demonstratives, therefore, cannot be used in this way to theorize about 
others' mental contents. 
 One might argue, in response, that demonstratives can be applied to experiences we are 
not having, e.g. they are seeing that same shade of red I saw an hour ago (Speaks, 2005). And, 
one may, therefore, believe that we can use demonstratives to think about fine-grained contents 
of others' experiences. The problem with this response is that even if one could use 
demonstratives to refer to fine-grained contents of non-current experiences, there is good reason 
to believe such demonstratives would be too diminished to be as finely grained as experience. 
Sean Kelly (2001b) presents a useful example. Imagine there are several sets of poker chips that 
are very similar shades of red. When placed side by side, one can distinguish the colors of each 
chip. But, when asked to remember if a chip seen at time one is the same color as a different chip 
seen at time two, one would be unable to answer. One's concept that shade of red seen at time 
one, would be too diminished to tell whether the chip seen at time two is the same color as the 
chip seen at time one. What occurs here is that one's concept that shade of red seen at time one 
has diminished with time and become more course-grained. The concept cannot be used to 
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differentiate or recognize as many shades of color as one can experience. Demonstratives of non-
current experience, therefore, cannot be used to attribute fine-grained content either. We must 
conclude, then, that theorizing is limited to attributing coarse-grained contents.14 
5.4 Theorizing and Richness 
The final component of the DTT is that our ToM cannot represent the richness of others' 
experiences. A visual experience of the Mona Lisa, an auditory experience of a symphony, a 
tactile sensation of a roughly textured surface all represent an enormous number of details, too 
many to be extracted into cognition or represented in a single thought. It follows from this that 
ToM-based attributions cannot represent the rich contents of others' experiences because ToM-
based attributions are typically understood as cognitive processes or thoughts. If cognition is not 
rich, then ToM-based cognitive processes are not rich.  
Moreover, in order to attribute rich contents when theorizing, it seems that 
demonstratives must be used. This is because, again, the rich details represented by an 
experience are fine-grained. As we saw earlier, though, demonstratives are unavailable for 
attribution of mental content in theorizing (or, if they are, they are more course grained than 
experiential contents). So they cannot be used to pick out all of the rich contents of another's 
experience and describe them. ToM-based thought is, thus, unable to employ the number or kind 
of concepts necessary to describe and represent the richness of others' conscious experiences. 
                                                 
14 It is also hard to see how one could think about a particular shade of color (or any other fine-grained content) that 
they are not currently experiencing without the use of mental imagery. Whenever I try to think about the particular 
shade of color my car is, for instance, I find myself forming a mental image of my car. The trouble is that, if one 
uses mental imagery whenever they think about a fine-grained content of another's experience one will just be 
engaging in a (high-level) simulation process and will not be theorizing. 
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6 WHAT SIMULATIONS CAN DO THAT THEORIZING CANNOT 
We can now turn to the Advantage of Simulation Thesis (AST) and finish defending 
premise three of my main argument. Premise three states that experiential properties are too 
difficult to describe in the mental code underlying our ToM, but not too difficult to replicate 
using simulations. Because simulations can replicate experiential properties, it follows (from 
premise two) that they can represent these properties. Following Biggs (2007, 2009), I will call 
simulations that replicate experiential properties phenomenal simulations. Why should we 
believe we can generate phenomenal simulations? In general, both introspective and empirical 
evidence supports this claim. 
6.1 Simulating phenomenal character 
First, let's consider whether we can generate simulations with phenomenal character. 
High-level simulations are simulations that utilize our general imaginative abilities. We can use 
high-level simulations to replicate other people's visual and auditory perceptions, bodily 
movement, and emotions among other states. Imagine seeing the Mona Lisa, raising your right 
arm, or imagine something that evokes an emotion (e.g. being attacked by a bear). When we 
imagine these things there is something it is like to imagine them, i.e. they have a phenomenal 
character that is apparent upon introspection. The phenomenal character might not be as vivid as 
an actual experience of the Mona Lisa, raising a right arm, etc. But, it is certainly there. Because 
high-level simulations just are imaginative processes used to replicate others' mental states, there 
is, therefore, good introspective evidence that we can generate high-level simulations with 
phenomenal character. 
The introspective evidence that low-level simulations have phenomenal character is not 
as strong. Low-level simulations are realized in mirror neurons, which automatically activate in 
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response to others' behavioral cues like facial expressions. Mirror neurons underlie emotions like 
fear and disgust as well as sensations like pain. It may not be clear whether mirroring has 
phenomenal character because low-level simulations are fast and automatic, and consequently, 
may occur without our attending closely to them. But, there is some reason to believe there exist 
low-level simulations with phenomenal character. Consider the fact that when you watch another 
smell something gross or injure themselves it often feels unpleasant to you. A plausible 
explanation of this unpleasant feeling is that it is phenomenal character of pain or disgust 
simulated by certain mirror neurons firing in response to the behavioral cues observed in others 
(Biggs, 2007, 37-38). 
The empirical evidence that simulations have phenomenal character consists of evidence 
that simulations use the same neural machinery as phenomenal states. This argument is made in 
detail by Stephen Biggs (2007). I only sketch it here. The idea is that, plausibly, the phenomenal 
character of an experience depends on the areas of the brain that realize it. My experience of the 
Mona Lisa has the phenomenal character that it does because of its underlying neural structures 
and processes. As we saw earlier, both high and low-level simulations use many of the same 
neural mechanisms as the states they simulate, and many of our simulations replicate 
phenomenal states. Specifically, low-level simulations replicate tactile sensations and emotions. 
High-level simulations replicate some sensory states, like visual and auditory experiences. 
Because such simulations use the same brain areas as phenomenal states, we have reason to 
believe that such simulations replicate the phenomenal character of those phenomenal states.15 
                                                 
15  One may argue that the same brain areas can be used in different ways, and, therefore, it is always possible that 
our simulations use their neural realizers differently than the states they are simulating. This suggests that 
simulations and the states they simulate may not have the same experiential properties. But, there is little evidence to 
suggest that simulations function very differently than the states they are simulating. There are some differences to 
be sure. But, converging evidence suggests that simulations use similar brain areas as the states they simulate and in 
similar ways. The aim of simulation after all is to replicate a mental state, including the way it functions (see Biggs 
(2007) for lengthier defense of this point).  
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Taken together, introspection and the neural underpinnings of simulations provide a strong case 
for the claim that some of our simulations have phenomenal character.  
6.2 Simulating the perspectival aspect of experience 
A similar argument can be made for simulating the perspectival aspect of experience, 
which is the aspect of one's experience of an object that changes with viewing position and 
angle. Remember, perspectival aspects seem largely limited to visual and auditory experience, so 
simulations of perspectival aspects would be limited to visual and auditory simulations, which 
are high-level simulations.  
There is good introspective evidence that we can simulate the perspectival aspect of 
visual and auditory experience. When we imagine seeing an object, like, say, the Mona Lisa or a 
car, we can imagine viewing it from a point of view. One can imagine hearing a car horn, for 
example, coming from in front of them then imagine turning around and hearing the same car 
horn. Even though we imagine the sound coming from the same location, each imagined 
experience seems different (one sound comes toward my front, the other toward my back), and 
thus we simulate the perspectival aspects. 
The perspectival aspect of experience is also plausibly dependent on its neural 
underpinnings. The perspectival contents exist because there are different angles and ways 
sensory information from the same object (i.e. reflected light, sound waves) can strike our retina 
and our inner ears. Because the perceptual areas of the brain that encode this perspectival 
information underlie simulations, we would expect phenomenal simulations to encode this 
information as well. There is also well established evidence that people can visually imagine 
objects from a particular points of view and mentally rotate them to determine how they appear 
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from different perspectives (Cohen, Kosslyn, Breiter, Belliveau, 1996). Thus, both the 
introspective and empirical considerations taken together provide good evidence we can and 
sometimes do generate simulations with perspectival aspects. 
6.3 Simulating fineness of grain  
Are simulations finely grained? There is some introspective evidence that suggests they 
are. A simulation of seeing a house seems to represent fine grained color and shape contents (a 
house of a particular shape and specific shade of color). Simulations of hearing a song seem to 
have fine-grained auditory contents, e.g. particular pitches. It seems plausible as well that low-
level simulations (mirror neurons) can replicate fine grained contents by replicating the particular 
intensity of the emotional feeling or sensation being mirrored. Now, admittedly, the fine-grained 
contents of simulations seem somewhat fleeting or unstable. It is difficult to maintain a 
simulation with highly specific contents for a significant period of time. I find it difficult to 
maintain a high-level simulation of a specific shade of color for significant time, for instance. 
But, when the simulation is occurring its contents do indeed seem finely grained. 
One source of empirical evidence is, again, evidence that simulations utilize the same 
areas of the brain as the states they simulate. The fineness of grain of experience likely has much 
to do with the way specific perceptual areas of the brain realize the perceptual experiences. Since 
simulations use the areas of the brain that realize finely grained percepts, we would expect our 
simulations to be finely grained too. Other empirical evidence supports this more directly. In one 
study on visual imagery a strong correlation was found between subjective reports of how vivid a 
mental image was and how much activity (relative to overall brain activity) was devoted to early 
areas of the visual cortex (Cui, Jeter, Yang, Montague, and Eagleman, 2007). It is not completely 
clear how participants are understanding 'vividness', but it is likely that they are in part 
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identifying how finely grained or specific the contents of their conscious mental image are. This 
is further evidence that using (more of) the perceptual areas of the brain that underlie fine-
grained experiences yields finely grain simulations.  
6.4 Simulating richness  
That simulations have rich contents is not as clear upon introspection as, say, 
introspective evidence for the claim that simulations have phenomenal character. When 
simulating the Mona Lisa from another's point of view, the simulation does not seem on 
introspection to be as rich as an actual visual experience of the painting. It does not represent all 
of the different color hues and spatial details that would be present in an actual visual experience 
of the painting. A simulation of hearing a certain orchestral symphony lacks some of the 
temporal and tonal complexity of an experience of an actual symphony. 
The fact that phenomenal simulations are not as rich as the experiences they simulate, 
however, does not imply they are not rich. Again, the richness hypothesis says that experiences 
represent more information than can be cognitively extracted into working memory (or contained 
in a single thought). Although my simulation of seeing the Mona Lisa may not be as rich as an 
actual conscious perception of the Mona Lisa, it does not mean this imaginative experience does 
not contain more information than can be contained in working memory or contained in thought.  
Introspectively, my simulations of seeing the Mona Lisa or hearing a symphony do seem 
rich despite the fact that they are not as rich as the actual experiences they are supposed to 
simulate. Empirical evidence supports this claim too. Psychologists James Brockmole, Ranxiao 
Wang, and David Irwin (2002), for example, found that people were able to generate and 
maintain a mental image of twelve dots for around 5 seconds, and they were able to use that 
mental image to complete a task requiring they mentally superimpose the image onto another 
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grid of dots on a display screen (participants subjectively reported imagining and superimposing 
the dots during the task). This mental image is quite rich. The size, color, and relative spatial 
location of twelve dots is a lot of information to represent — more than can be contained in a 
single thought or in working memory with its limited capacity (Block, 2011). This provides good 
evidence that, even though phenomenal simulations may not be as rich as the experiences they 
simulate, phenomenal simulations are nonetheless rich. 
6.5 Projecting Phenomenal Simulations 
We have just seen that there is good reason to believe we can generate simulations with 
phenomenal character, perspectival aspects, fineness of grain, and richness. It follows that we 
can generate simulations that replicate the experiential properties of others' conscious states. 
Because simulations replicate the experiential properties of others' conscious states, simulations 
play the right cognitive role to qualify as representing these properties, as experiential properties 
replicated by a phenomenal simulation can be cognitively accessed and utilized by the simulator.  
Exactly how we introspect and access our own conscious experiences is still debated (see, 
Balog, 2009). I am partial to a demonstrative view. It seems to me we can form beliefs like that 
person is having this experience where this experience is a concept that involves mentally 
pointing directly to a phenomenal simulation in one's own mind. It also seems possible to think 
about and project the particular phenomenal character, perspectival aspects, and finely-grained 
contents of a simulation. If one simulates, for instance, seeing the Mona Lisa, one can form the 
belief that the target is seeing a figure with this particular shape and color or as having a this 
particular look from a certain angle. One can form the belief that the phenomenal character of 
target's experience is like this where this involves mentally pointing directly to the particular feel 
or what-it-is-likeness of the phenomenal simulation. If our simulation is rich, we can also extract 
32 
and project the contents too. We will not be able to extract all the contents at once, but we can, 
over a period of time, attend to most or all of the contents and form the belief that another's 
experience has those contents. However introspection works, what is clear is that the experiential 
properties replicated by phenomenal simulations can play a significant cognitive role, and thus 
qualify as representing the experiential properties of others' experiences. 
7 THE LIMITED RANGE OF PHENOMENAL SIMULATIONS 
There is good reason to believe that we can and do generate phenomenal simulations and 
that these simulations can represent the experiential properties of others' conscious states. But, 
simulations have a limited range — we can only simulate a limited set of experiences. There are 
several factors that restrict the range of phenomenal simulations. First off, we may not have the 
necessary memories or concepts needed to generate certain high-level simulations. For example, 
if one has never seen the Mona Lisa, they will be unable to form a clear or detailed simulation of 
another's visual experience of the Mona Lisa. If one has never tasted a Durian fruit, they will 
likely be unable to simulate what it tastes like. And, if one does not remember the way a certain 
song sounds, they will be unable to simulate another's auditory experience of that song. In order 
to generate high-level simulations of these experiences, it seems one must have the rights sorts of 
concepts or information stored in memory.  
Second, simulations are limited by the simulator's cognitive or neural architecture. This 
claim is based on the idea that simulations utilize the same neural or cognitive machinery as the 
states they simulate. So, one who is completely color blind, for example, will be unable to 
simulate other people's color experiences because they lack the visual systems necessary to form 
such simulations. People will also be unable to simulate the experiences of animals which utilize 
perceptual systems humans lack. For example, one cannot simulate, the echolocative experiences 
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of bats because people do not have echolocative systems that can be used to generate such 
simulations (Nagel, 1974, 438-442).16 Brain damage to areas used to simulate experience will 
also limit the range of the phenomenal simulations one may use. A person with damage to  
mirror neurons underlying fear will be unable to generate low-level simulations of others' 
experiences of fear.  
Stephen Biggs (2007) suggests an another way in which the range of our phenomenal 
simulations is limited. Namely, he suggests that we do not simulate perceptual experiences. He 
finds it implausible that high-level simulations are used at all because they are not generated 
automatically in social situations. If we see someone viewing a painting, he argues, we do not 
automatically imagine the way the painting looks to them (Biggs, 2007, 38). If this suggestion is 
right, it would severely limit the range of our phenomenal simulations to only those few 
emotions and sensations that are simulated by our low-level simulations (mirror neurons).  
There is little reason to buy Biggs' suggestion, however. Just because high-level 
simulations of perceptual experiences are not automatic does not mean they are not used. Many 
cognitive systems are not automatic, yet are still commonly utilized to carry out certain cognitive 
tasks (e.g. top-down attention). Furthermore, Biggs does not directly challenge any empirical 
evidence in support of high level simulations (including the study discussed in section two or any 
of the evidence presented by Goldman (2006, ch.7)). Therefore, although the range of our 
simulations are limited by our concepts, memories, and cognitive architecture, there is no reason 
to believe simulations are as limited as Biggs suggests.  
                                                 
16  Nagel's (1974) specific comment is that in order to understand the subjective character of another's experience, 
we must be able to "take up their point of view", and the greater the differences in mental or neural structure the 
"less success one can expect" in taking up their point of view (442).  
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, I argued that our ToM (and ToM-based thought) is unable to represent the 
phenomenal character, perspectival aspect, fineness of grain, or richness of other people's 
experiences, but simulations are able to represent these experiential properties. Simulations, for 
this reason, provide us with a deeper understanding of others' experiences than theorizing can. 
Although simulations can represent experiential properties, we also saw they are imperfect. They 
can represent the richness and fineness of grain of others' experiences but not in their full detail 
and specificity. Furthermore, simulations have a range limited by our finite memories, concepts, 
and cognitive architecture. Despite these limitations, however, simulations are clearly our best 
means for understanding the experiential properties of other people's minds. 
My theses support a certain view about the division of labor between theorizing and 
simulation: theorizing is used to form less detailed, more abstract representations of other 
people's psychology, while simulations are used to create richer, more detailed representations 
(e.g. Godfrey-Smith, 2005, 7-9). This view may suggest that theorizing is more useful in 
common everyday interactions with others because forming less detailed descriptions of others' 
psychologies is less cognitively taxing than generating more detailed simulations. And in our 
everyday common interactions with others more abstract theorizing is likely enough to get by. 
An interesting question that an account of conscious state attribution and understanding must 
explain, that has not been discussed here, is what motivates one to construct more detailed 
simulations given that they are more cognitively taxing than theorizing. More specifically, what 
motivates one to shift from creating the more sparse and objective descriptions involved in 
theorizing, to a more detailed and subjective representation that captures the first-personal, 
experiential details of others' minds? Maybe there is some connection to moral psychology that 
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can explain this move. Maybe understanding the details of others' experiences plays a role in 
forming close social bonds with others. In any case, in order to answer these questions, an 
analogous shift is required within discussions concerning folk psychology — away from the 
traditional focus on explaining how people understand the causal properties and contents of 
others' attitudes and towards a new focus on explaining the way we understand the experiential 
properties of other conscious minds. 
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